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The statute, particularly subsection (a), grants the Director the authority to seek enforcement of specific types of notices and orders in district court. This constitutes a clear instruction on a specific regulatory task, making it a Specific Authority delegation.

The statute, 12 U.S.C. § 4635, authorizes the Director to apply to district courts for enforcement of notices or orders issued under the subchapters and limits court jurisdiction. While it empowers the Director, it doesn’t mandate specific regulatory actions. The regulation, 12 CFR Part 1777, concerns prompt corrective action. 12 U.S.C. § 4635 is explicitly listed as an authority for 12 CFR Part 1777. The statute authorizes the director to take certain enforcement actions, which is reflected in the Prompt Corrective Action regulations. Thus, the relationship is authorized but not mandated.

While 12 U.S.C. § 4631 provides the Director with broad discretion, it also enumerates specific situations, regulatory tasks, and actions related to unsafe or unsound practices and violations. For example, it lists specific actions the Director can take like requiring restitution or restricting growth of the regulated entity.

12 U.S.C. § 4631 provides the Director with the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders in cases of unsafe practices or violations. The statute uses permissive language (“may”), indicating that the Director is authorized to act but not mandated to do so in every instance of a violation or unsafe practice. This distinguishes it from a directly mandated relationship, where the agency would be required to take specific action.

The statute explicitly outlines the conditions and procedures for issuing temporary cease-and-desist orders, including the specific circumstances related to insolvency, asset dissipation, or incomplete records. This directive provides a clear regulatory task for the Director. The reference to “violation” or practices requiring a cease and desist order, further specifies the regulatory task or gap.

12 U.S.C. § 4632 authorizes the Director to issue temporary cease-and-desist orders. While the statute authorizes this action, it doesn’t explicitly mandate any specific regulation about executive compensation stemming from such orders. It permits but does not require regulations in that area, thereby defining an authorized but not mandated relationship.

The statute explicitly outlines specific scenarios where the Director can issue temporary cease-and-desist orders (e.g., likely insolvency, incomplete records). It also specifies the procedures for judicial review and enforcement. While the director has discretion within those defined scenarios, the authority is tied to specific conditions and actions, not a broad mandate to regulate capital adequacy generally. The statute provides detailed guidance on the Director’s regulatory task.

12 U.S.C. 4631-36 is listed under the authority for the regulation. This means that the statute authorizes the regulation. The statute provides the director with the power to take certain actions but does not mandate specific regulations concerning temporary cease and desist orders or capital adequacy of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship is authorized, but not mandated.

The statute clearly instructs the Director on a specific regulatory task (issuing temporary cease-and-desist orders) when certain conditions are met (e.g., actions likely to cause insolvency, incomplete or inaccurate records). While the statute uses terms like “likely” which allows for some agency discretion, the conditions and permissible actions are defined.

The statute authorizes the Director to issue temporary cease-and-desist orders under specific conditions, but does not mandate the creation of specific regulations to govern all aspects of this authority. The regulation 24 CFR Part 81 concerns the regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by the Secretary of HUD and this regulation can potentially be used to create rules or define processes that involve the Director’s authority related to temporary cease-and-desist orders.

The statute details specific procedural requirements for hearings under sections 4631, 4636(c), and 4636a, including venue, timing, procedure, and consequences for failure to appear. It also sets a timeline for the Director’s decision after the hearing. This level of detail indicates a specific instruction from Congress regarding how these particular hearings should be conducted.

The statute specifies requirements for hearings related to actions described in sections 4631, 4636, and 4636a. While the statute mandates certain procedures for hearings, it does not explicitly mandate the regulation of capital adequacy directly. However, the regulation 12 CFR Part 1240, cited within 12 U.S.C. 4631-36 in its authority section, does relate to the actions described in the statute, and thus the regulation of capital adequacy is authorized, but not directly mandated by this specific statute focusing on hearing procedures.

The statute specifically directs the Director to establish “criteria governing the portfolio holdings of the enterprises” and provides guidance on what to consider when establishing these criteria, which aligns with the definition of Specific Authority Delegation.

The statute 12 U.S.C. § 4624(a) uses the word “shall” with respect to the Director establishing criteria by regulation. This creates a direct mandate for the Director to issue regulations.

While §4631 provides broad authority for cease and desist orders and affirmative action, the regulation in question restricts the acquisition of mortgages with private transfer fee covenants. Given the nature of a Cease and Desist the statute gives a specific directive to the director, which allows the director to create restrictions on the acquisition of these mortgages.

12 U.S.C. § 4631 provides the Director with the authority to issue cease and desist orders against regulated entities engaging in unsafe or unsound practices or violating laws, rules, regulations, or orders. While it provides the authority to act in these situations, it does not mandate that the Director issue regulations concerning restrictions on mortgages with private transfer fee covenants. The regulation at 12 CFR Part 1228 implements restrictions, falling within the authorized scope of preventing unsafe or unsound practices.

While the statute provides the Director with specific tools to address unsafe practices and violations, it does not specifically direct the agency to create rules related to executive compensation, despite the statute’s broad affirmative power. The agency could reasonably conclude that regulating executive compensation would further the goals of preventing unsafe practices, but that conclusion involves the agency’s broad interpretation and discretion.

12 U.S.C. § 4631 authorizes the Director to issue cease-and-desist orders, including taking affirmative action such as requiring restitution and limiting activities, when a regulated entity engages in unsafe or unsound practices or violates laws, rules, or regulations. The regulation, 12 CFR Part 1230, which concerns executive compensation, is authorized by this statute, as the statute’s power to require restitution could be argued to affect executive compensation; however, it is not explicitly mandated by the statute.

The statute gives the Director specific authority to issue cease and desist orders if the director believes the entity is engaging in or has engaged in unsafe or unsound practices. The statute goes on to define what actions the Director can compel the regulated entity to perform to remedy violations.

12 U.S.C. § 4631 provides the Director with the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders, but does not explicitly mandate specific regulations. The authority to implement regulations is authorized, allowing the Director to define “unsafe or unsound practices” and establish procedures, but is not directly mandated.

The statute provides clear direction to the Director regarding unsafe or unsound practices and violations. It explicitly states that the Director “may issue and serve” a notice of charges and a cease-and-desist order under certain circumstances. This constitutes a specific regulatory task, even though terms like “unsafe or unsound” require interpretation and application. The statute provides clear triggers and specific remedies, thus fitting within the “Specific Authority” category.

The regulation (12 CFR Part 1777) explicitly cites 12 U.S.C. § 4631 as one of its authorities. This indicates that the statute authorizes the regulation, but doesn’t explicitly mandate it. The agency has the discretion to create regulations pursuant to the statute, but it is not required to do so.

The statute instructs the Director on a specific regulatory task: establishing a deadline for submission of capital restoration plans. It even provides constraints, such as the deadline cannot be more than 45 days, and that extensions are permissible if the Director “determines it necessary.” This level of specificity indicates a specific authority delegation.

12 U.S.C. § 4622(b) states “The Director shall, by regulation, establish a deadline for submission of a capital restoration plan…” This is a direct mandate, requiring the Director to issue regulations to establish a deadline.

The statute specifically establishes the process for judicial review of the Director’s actions, including the scope of review and limitations on jurisdiction. This is a clear instruction on a specific regulatory task – how agency actions are reviewed. This goes beyond simply granting broad authority; it lays out particular procedures and standards related to judicial oversight.

12 U.S.C. § 4623 does not directly mandate any specific regulation. However, it authorizes the Director to take certain actions and provides for judicial review of those actions. 12 CFR Part 1229 is listed as being authorized by 12 USC 4623.

While § 4623 doesn’t directly instruct the agency to create rules about judicial review, it anticipates agency action regarding classifications and supervisory actions of regulated entities, and establishes a procedure for judicial review of those actions. This implicitly authorizes the agency to promulgate rules regarding the process by which these reviews are conducted and, by specifically addressing judicial review, provides a “specific regulatory task” within the meaning of Hickman’s classification framework.

12 U.S.C. § 4623 is explicitly listed as an authority for 12 CFR Part 1777. This indicates that the regulation is directly mandated, as the statute provides the legal basis for the regulation’s existence.

Although 12 U.S.C. 4623 is primarily about judicial review, it inherently and specifically authorizes agency (Director) actions that can be taken which are the subject of judicial review. The agency action is the classification of the entity or a discretionary supervisory action. Congress defined in detail how the judicial review of agency actions is handled. The statute details the process for seeking judicial review, the court that will hear it, and the standard by which the court can overturn it. The statute clearly instructs an agency on a specific task, using open-ended terms like “appropriate,” “reasonable,” or “necessary” by creating specific procedures for the Director’s decisions to be reviewed by the US Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

The statute (12 U.S.C. § 4623) concerns judicial review of actions taken by the Director. The regulation (24 CFR Part 81) governs the Secretary of HUD’s regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The statute does not directly mandate or explicitly authorize the specific regulation. The statute concerns the process of appealing the director’s action to the court, while the regulation outlines the rules the Director enforces. The relationship is related through its governance of the Regulated entities, but not directly mandated or explicitly authorized.

The statute directs the Director to establish criteria for portfolio holdings to ensure sufficient capital and safe operations. While the terms like “sufficient capital” and “safe and sound operations” are open-ended, the statute specifies the area of regulation (portfolio holdings) and the goals (sufficient capital, safe and sound operations). The statute also includes considerations that the Director shall consider, which constrains agency discretion to some extent. The specific requirement to consider securitization, the mortgage market and 4513b further supports this categorization.

Subsection (a) of the statute explicitly states that “The Director shall, by regulation, establish criteria governing the portfolio holdings of the enterprises…” This is a direct mandate. The regulation 12 CFR Part 1252 is explicitly authorized by 12 U.S.C. 4624.

The statute, 12 U.S.C. § 4618, specifically instructs the Director to provide written notice and a response period before taking certain actions related to classification or supervisory actions of regulated entities. This is a clearly defined regulatory task.

12 U.S.C. § 4618 is explicitly listed in the “Authority” section of 12 CFR Part 1229, indicating that the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

The statute lays out a specific process for the agency, in this case the Director, to follow when taking certain actions. It specifically states what must be included in the notice, the length of the response period, and how the Director must consider information provided by the regulated entity. While there is some discretion in the Director’s ability to extend or shorten the response period, the statute clearly instructs the agency on a specific regulatory task of providing notice and opportunity to respond to regulated entities before taking action.

12 U.S.C. § 4618 directly mandates the Director to provide written notice and a response period to regulated entities before taking specific actions like classification or reclassification under section 4614, or discretionary supervisory actions under sections 4615 and 4616. The regulation, 12 CFR Part 1777, implements prompt corrective action, which is closely related to these classifications and supervisory actions, thus fulfilling the statute’s requirements for notice and response. The “Authority” section of the regulation explicitly cites 12 U.S.C. 4611-4619, including 4618, as its basis.

The statute explicitly instructs the Director to provide written notice, states the reasons for the proposed action, and establishes a response period. This demonstrates a specific regulatory task outlined by Congress, thus indicating a specific authority delegation.

12 U.S.C. § 4618 directly mandates specific actions by the Director related to providing notice and an opportunity to respond before taking certain supervisory actions. The regulation in 24 CFR Part 81, Subpart G “Procedures for Actions and Review of Actions,” seems likely to be related to implementing these statutory requirements for notice and response procedures, making the relationship directly mandated.

The statute clearly instructs the Director to establish a deadline for capital restoration plans via regulation. The statute dictates a regulatory task – setting a deadline – and therefore falls under specific authority delegation even though the Director has some discretion in determining what that deadline may be, and whether it may be extended.

12 U.S.C. § 4622(b) explicitly states “The Director shall, by regulation, establish a deadline for submission of a capital restoration plan…” This directly mandates the agency to create a regulation.

The statute specifically instructs the Director to issue regulations establishing deadlines for capital restoration plans. It also provides constraints on the deadlines (e.g., “not be more than 45 days”) and permits extensions under specific circumstances (“to the extent that the Director determines it necessary”). This level of specificity aligns with the “Specific Authority” delegation category.

12 U.S.C. § 4622(b) explicitly states, “The Director shall, by regulation, establish a deadline for submission of a capital restoration plan…” This directly mandates the agency to issue a regulation. 12 CFR Part 1777’s authority section also lists 12 U.S.C. § 4622 as an authority.

Subsection (b)(1) gives the agency broad authority to “prescribe such regulations as the Agency determines to be appropriate regarding the conduct of conservatorships or receiverships.” While the statute details what the agency can do as conservator or receiver, it does not provide specific regulatory tasks but rather authorizes the Agency to determine how these functions will be conducted via rulemaking. This fits the definition of a General Authority delegation.

12 CFR Part 1234 explicitly cites 12 U.S.C. 4617 as its authority. This indicates a directly mandated relationship as the regulation is implemented to enforce/detail/clarify the statute.

Subsection (b)(1) states: “The Agency may prescribe such regulations as the Agency determines to be appropriate regarding the conduct of conservatorships or receiverships.” This language provides broad discretion to the agency without specifying particular regulatory tasks or gaps. It relies on the agency’s own determination of what regulations are “appropriate.”

12 CFR Part 1237 explicitly cites 12 U.S.C. 4617 as its authority. This demonstrates a direct mandate relationship where the statute grants the agency authority to issue regulations regarding conservatorship and receivership, and the agency has acted upon that authority.

Subsection (b)(1) of 12 U.S. Code § 4617 grants the Agency broad rulemaking authority: “The Agency may prescribe such regulations as the Agency determines to be appropriate regarding the conduct of conservatorships or receiverships.” This is a very general statement, it doesn’t specify which regulatory gaps need to be filled, or tasks the agency needs to undertake. It provides wide latitude regarding the Agency’s actions.

12 CFR Part 1242 explicitly cites 12 U.S.C. 4617 as its authority. This signifies that the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

This statute provides specific guidance and conditions under which the Agency Director may appoint the Agency as conservator or receiver. Although broad terms like “discretion” and “appropriate” are used, they are applied within specific contexts and criteria detailed in the statute, such as insufficient assets, substantial dissipation of assets, unsafe conditions, and violations of law. These instructions guide the Director”™s actions and decision-making. Even with the use of terms such as “appropriate”, it provides the agency with direction in a specific gap in the law to create regulations for.

12 CFR Part 1777 explicitly cites 12 U.S.C. 4611-4619, including the provided statute 12 U.S.C. 4617, as its legal authority, indicating that the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.