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Although 10 U.S.C. § 271 doesn’t directly authorize 48 CFR Part 7, the regulation is authorized under Title 10. The title broadly deals with Armed Forces regulations, and 48 CFR Part 7 uses 10 U.S.C. chapters 4 and 137 (legacy provisions) as authority. As such, the authorizing statute provides broad rulemaking authority without identifying any specific regulatory gaps that need to be filled.

10 U.S.C. § 271 discusses the sharing of information between the Department of Defense and civilian law enforcement officials. 48 CFR Part 7 pertains to acquisition planning. While DoD acquisitions might generate information that could be shared under 10 U.S.C. § 271, the regulation isn’t directly mandated or explicitly authorized by the statute. They are related in that they both pertain to the Department of Defense, but the statute does not require the regulation, nor does it explicitly authorize it.

The statute provides broad authority to the Secretary of Defense, using the permissive “may,” and does not identify specific regulatory tasks, gaps, or requirements beyond “in accordance with other applicable law.” This falls under the definition of a general authority delegation.

The statute authorizes the Secretary of Defense to make resources available to law enforcement, but it does not mandate that they do so. The word “may” indicates permissive authority.

10 U.S.C. § 273 provides a clear regulatory task, specifically authorizing the Secretary of Defense to train and advise civilian law enforcement. Even with open-ended aspects like “other applicable law,” the delegation focuses on a defined regulatory gap.

The statute, 10 U.S.C. § 273, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to make personnel available for training and advising civilian law enforcement. 48 CFR Part 7 generally concerns acquisition planning. While the statute doesn’t directly mandate the specific regulations outlined in Part 7, the provision of training and advice necessitates planning and potentially acquiring resources. Therefore, the regulations are authorized to implement this provision, but not mandated.

The statute defines a term directly used within the agency’s claims process. Although definitional, it constrains and guides the agency’s actions in a specific area of its regulatory function, rather than providing broader discretionary powers.

10 U.S.C. § 2731 defines “settle” which informs how the Department of Defense considers and disposes of claims, directly impacting the scope and application of claim settlement regulations. 32 CFR Part 536 is among the regulations that fall under this ambit.

The statute instructs the agency (Department of Defense and its component agencies) on the specific regulatory task of settling and paying claims for property loss, personal injury, or death incident to noncombat activities, and includes specific claim limitations.

The statute (10 U.S.C. § 2733) explicitly states “Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe…”, directly mandating the creation of regulations.

10 U.S.C. § 2674(c) provides a directive focused on ensuring the safe, efficient, and secure operation of the Pentagon Reservation. This is a specific regulatory task, not a broad delegation. The statute specifies the subject matter of regulation (operation of the Pentagon Reservation) and the purpose of regulation (safe, efficient, and secure operation), even providing examples such as rules regarding operation and parking of motor vehicles.

The regulation 32 CFR Part 234 is explicitly authorized and derives its authority from 10 U.S.C. 2674(c), as indicated in the “Authority” section of the regulation. This subsection of the statute grants the Secretary of Defense the power to “prescribe such rules and regulations as the Secretary considers appropriate to ensure the safe, efficient, and secure operation of the Pentagon Reservation.”

The statute clearly outlines a specific regulatory task (base closures and realignments) and instructs the Secretary of Defense on how to proceed, including notifications to Congress, evaluations of consequences, and consideration of specified criteria. While the term “evaluation” might seem broad, the subsequent detail provided fulfills the Hickman “Specific Authority” criteria.

The statute authorizes the Secretary of Defense to take actions regarding base closures and realignments, but it doesn’t directly mandate them. The “notwithstanding any other provision of law” language indicates an authorization to act, within certain constraints, not a direct order.

While broad in scope (dealing with base closures and realignments), the statute clearly instructs the Secretary on a specific regulatory task: the closure and realignment of military bases under specific conditions. It provides explicit procedures, notification requirements, and considerations to be made (economic, environmental impact, etc.), using terms like “evaluation,” “criteria,” and “ability” which Hickman classifies as Specific Authority.

The statute authorizes the Secretary of Defense to close or realign military installations, but does not mandate that they do so. The statute sets forth the procedure they must follow if they do decide to close or realign.

Subsection (d)(2)(A) of 10 U.S.C. § 2705 specifically directs the Secretary to prescribe regulations regarding the “establishment, characteristics, composition, and funding of restoration advisory boards.” This is a clear instruction on a specific regulatory task, falling under the “Specific Authority” category.

32 CFR Part 202 explicitly cites 10 U.S.C. 2705 in its authority section, indicating a direct mandate for the regulations. Subsection (d)(2)(A) of the statute states, “The Secretary shall prescribe regulations regarding the establishment, characteristics, composition, and funding of restoration advisory boards pursuant to this subsection.”

The statute explicitly instructs the Secretary of Defense to establish regulations regarding the characteristics, composition, and funding of restoration advisory boards. This falls under specific authority delegation as it clearly instructs an agency on a specific regulatory task.

32 CFR Part 203 explicitly cites 10 U.S.C. 2705 as its authority. This indicates a direct mandate.

While the statute grants the Secretary of Defense discretion, it specifically directs the agency to promulgate regulations related to the “cooperation and assistance” to scouting organizations, providing a specific regulatory task.

The statute explicitly mandates the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations related to cooperation and assistance provided to qualified scouting organizations.

The statute instructs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations to govern the cooperation and assistance with scouting organizations, including specifics such as transportation, office space, and reimbursement, providing a clear regulatory task. While terms like “necessary” are used, they are employed in the context of specific regulatory tasks related to the established cooperation and assistance.

10 U.S.C. § 2606(b) explicitly states that “Cooperation and assistance under subsection (a) shall be provided under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense…” This directly mandates the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations.

The statute broadly delegates authority to the President to arm watercraft and aircraft through any agency of the Department of Defense, when a national security threat is determined. While it identifies the broad task (arming craft), it doesn’t specify how the agency designated by the president should regulate the acquisition or modification of the specified craft.

The statute allows the President to arm watercraft/aircraft. 48 CFR Part 7 discusses acquisition planning. The statute does not explicitly mandate or authorize the regulation. However, acquisition planning is a related consideration when the government considers arming watercraft and aircraft.

While the statute grants broad authority to regulate charter air transportation, it outlines specific requirements and areas for regulation, such as technical safety evaluations, inspections, suspension guidelines, and the Commercial Airlift Review Board. This qualifies it as a Specific Authority Delegation under Hickman’s framework.

Subsection (i) of the statute explicitly states, “The Secretary shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section…” This language directly mandates the creation of regulations.

While 10 U.S.C. § 2667 grants the Secretary concerned broad authority to lease property, it also outlines the specific conditions and considerations that must be met when entering into such leases. The regulation, 32 CFR Part 623, while related to loaning material and not leasing, it specifies detailed procedures and criteria for the evaluation of proposals.

The regulation at 32 CFR Part 623 explicitly cites 10 U.S.C. 2667 as one of its authorities. This means the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

The statute explicitly instructs the Secretary of Defense to transfer specific types of property (excess, suitable for fire/EMS) to specific recipients (firefighting agencies) under specific conditions. Although the Secretary determines suitability, this does not make it a general delegation, as the delegation is quite specific and well-defined.

32 CFR Part 273 explicitly cites 10 U.S.C. § 2576b in its “Authority” section, meaning the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

The statute clearly instructs the Secretary of Defense on a specific regulatory task: to prescribe regulations regarding the sale of recyclable materials and the operation of recycling programs at military installations. While the statute provides some discretion in how the regulations are designed, the instruction to create these regulations is very specific.

10 U.S. Code § 2577(a)(1) explicitly mandates that “The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations” related to the sale and operation of recycling programs.

Subsection (e)(4) of the statute requires the Secretaries concerned to issue uniform regulations governing specific aspects of gifts conditioned on naming rights. This is a clear instruction regarding a specific regulatory task, pushing it into the Specific Authority category.

33 CFR Part 17 explicitly cites 10 U.S.C. 2601 in its authority section, indicating a direct mandate for the regulation.

The statute instructs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations, and while the scope of these regulations is broad (regarding cooperation and assistance of the Red Cross), subsection (c) provides a specific, limited area (passport fees) where regulations may be needed to implement the statute’s intent that no fee may be charged for passports issued to employees of the American National Red Cross traveling internationally to perform duties.

10 U.S. Code § 2602(c) specifically addresses passport fees for American National Red Cross employees and 22 CFR Part 22 explicitly cites 10 U.S.C. 2602(c) in its authority section, indicating a direct mandate to implement regulations related to this aspect of the statute.

The statute specifically instructs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations concerning cooperation and assistance to qualified scouting organizations. While the terms ‘cooperation’ and ‘assistance’ are open-ended, the legislation explicitly identifies the task (regulating cooperation and assistance to scouting organizations), making it a specific authority delegation. The statute delineates what may be provided to qualified scouting organizations (transportation, office space, reimbursement). These provisions narrow the scope of the delegation.

10 U.S. Code § 2606(b) explicitly states that “Cooperation and assistance under subsection (a) shall be provided under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense…” This is a direct mandate. Additionally, 32 CFR Part 212 lists 10 U.S.C. 2606 in its authority section, further indicating a direct statutory mandate.

While the statute provides broad authority to “dispose of all lost, abandoned, or unclaimed personal property,” it also outlines specific requirements such as diligent effort to find the owner, timeframes for holding property, and procedures for disposition and revenue usage. The “under such regulations as they may respectively prescribe” phrase is coupled with specific instructions about the regulatory task.

10 U.S.C. § 2575(a) explicitly authorizes the Secretaries of military departments and Homeland Security to dispose of unclaimed property “under such regulations as they may respectively prescribe,” indicating a direct mandate for regulatory action.

The statute provides broad rulemaking authority to the Secretaries regarding the disposition of unclaimed property, without prescribing specific regulatory tasks beyond the general framework outlined in the statute itself (e.g., diligent effort to find the owner).

10 U.S. Code § 2575(a) states the Secretaries “…under such regulations as they may respectively prescribe, may each by public or private sale or otherwise, dispose of all lost, abandoned, or unclaimed personal property.” This authorizes the regulation, but does not mandate it.

The statute provides specific direction to the Secretary of each military department and the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the disposition of unclaimed property. While “under such regulations as they may respectively prescribe” gives the Secretaries some discretion, the overall task and parameters are well-defined.

10 U.S.C. 2575(a) states that the Secretaries “under such regulations as they may respectively prescribe, may each by public or private sale or otherwise, dispose of all lost, abandoned, or unclaimed personal property…”. Therefore, the regulations are directly mandated by the statute.

The statute directs the agency (Secretary of Defense) to perform a specific task (selling surplus military equipment) to a defined group (State and local law enforcement, etc.) and provides some, although not exhaustive, parameters around that task (fair market value, suitable equipment, etc.). It uses terms such as “appropriate equipment”, which Hickman includes as a feature of Specific Authority Delegation.

The statute explicitly states, “The Secretary of Defense, under regulations prescribed by him, may sell…”, directly mandating the creation of regulations to govern the sales.

The statute clearly instructs the agency (Secretary of Defense) on the specific regulatory task of transferring excess personal property to federal and state agencies for law enforcement activities. Even though it uses terms like “suitable,” the statute provides significant detail regarding conditions of transfer, preferences for certain transfers, and prohibitions on transferring specific items. The statute creates a specific program, rather than giving the agency broad discretion.

32 CFR Part 273 specifically cites 10 U.S.C. § 2576a in its list of authorities. This means the regulation is directly mandated, or at least heavily influenced, by the statute.