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While 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) itself only grants the SEC the right to be heard, it also lays the foundation for the SEC’s role in bankruptcy proceedings. The citation of this statute alongside other statutes in 17 CFR Part 200’s authority section implies that regulations within Part 200 may relate to the SEC’s exercise of those rights or to the procedures around it, which would constitute a specific regulatory task.

The regulation (17 CFR Part 200) explicitly cites 11 U.S.C. 1109(a) as statutory authority. This indicates that the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

The statute clearly instructs the Secretary to create regulations concerning the process of investigating complaints of property damage caused by military personnel. Although the precise details of these regulations are left to the Secretary’s discretion, the regulatory task itself – establishing procedures for convening boards and assessing damages – is explicitly defined in the statute.

10 U.S. Code § 939(a) explicitly states “…he may, under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, convene a board to investigate the complaint.” The statute directly mandates that regulations be created to guide the convening of a board for investigating complaints.

The statute directs the agency (Department of the Air Force) to create “regulations” concerning the officer with whom the summary court-martial will deposit the assets. This is a clear instruction on a specific regulatory task, fitting the “Specific Authority” category.

32 CFR Part 281 specifically cites 10 U.S.C. § 9712 in its authority section, indicating that the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

The statute provides clear instructions regarding the process for handling the effects of deceased military personnel, including who is responsible (summary court-martial), what actions they must take (collecting effects, paying debts, sending effects to relatives), and how to dispose of effects if relatives cannot be found. While there is room for interpretation within these instructions, it is a specific regulatory task.

10 U.S.C. § 9712 is listed in the authority section for 32 CFR Part 282, indicating that the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

While 32 CFR Part 283 addresses waiver of debts resulting from erroneous payments, 10 U.S.C. § 9712(f) provides a specific regulatory task: to designate which officer should receive the cash from the summary court-martial. Regulations under 32 CFR Part 283 do not directly create the framework under 10 U.S.C. § 9712 to collect the effects of deceased.

10 U.S.C. § 9712(f) states that the summary court-martial shall deposit the cash with the officer designated in regulations, indicating that regulations are authorized to specify which officer should receive the funds, but it doesn’t mandate them. The statute provides the framework, but the regulation provides specifics on how to carry out part of the process.

The statute directs the Secretary of the Air Force to designate an officer to receive funds under specific circumstances as defined by 10 U.S. Code § 9712(f), which requires regulations for implementation, satisfying the criteria for Specific Authority Delegation.

10 U.S.C. § 9712 is listed in the authority section for 32 CFR Part 284

Although 10 U.S.C. § 8730(e) grants authority concerning limitations and licensing requirements related to the Export Administration Act of 1979, it provides this authority to a specific agency (Bureau of Industry and Security), task, and regulatory gap within a broader export context.. It specifies the conditions under which petroleum exports from naval petroleum reserves are subject to export controls, incorporating the requirements of the Export Administration Act.

10 U.S. Code § 8730(e) is explicitly cited as statutory authority for 15 CFR Part 730. Therefore, the relationship is directly mandated.

The statute 10 U.S.C. 8730(e) explicitly dictates that petroleum produced from naval petroleum reserves is subject to the limitations and licensing requirements of the Export Administration Act of 1979 and establishes specific export conditions. This provides a clear regulatory task (controlling exports) and the condition the president must follow.

10 U.S.C. § 8730(e) is explicitly cited in the “Authority” section for 15 CFR Part 738. This demonstrates a direct mandate where the statute provides the basis for the regulation.

Subsection (e) gives the Secretary the authority to administer export limitations and licensing requirements on petroleum, providing a specific regulatory task.

10 U.S. Code § 8730(e) is explicitly listed as authority for 15 CFR Part 774, which is directly mandated.

10 U.S.C. § 876b details procedures for handling individuals within the military justice system who lack mental capacity or responsibility. 28 CFR Part 549, Subpart C specifically, concerns psychiatric evaluation and treatment, and the Attorney General’s responsibilities as detailed in 10 U.S.C. § 876b, directly instructing the Bureau of Prisons on specific regulatory tasks related to mental health services. Therefore, it is a Specific Authority delegation.

The regulation, 28 CFR Part 549, specifically cites 10 U.S.C. § 876b in its authority section. This indicates that the regulation is directly mandated, or at least closely tied to the statute.

The statute identifies a very specific regulatory task: prescribing regulations for commanding officers to convene a board to investigate complaints of property damage or wrongful taking by service members. This goes beyond broad rulemaking and focuses on a particular mechanism.

10 U.S. Code § 939(a) explicitly states that the commanding officer may convene a board to investigate complaints “under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe.” This indicates a direct mandate from the statute for the Secretary to create regulations.

While the current iteration of the statute concerns Silver Star Medals, the regulation is connected to the prior version of the statute. The prior iteration provided a specific instruction to the agency regarding the requirements of medical and dental officers.

The statute and regulation are related because they share the same U.S. Code citation. However, the statute concerns the awarding of a Silver Star medal, while the regulation concerns the appointment of doctors of osteopathy as medical officers. The statute does not directly mandate nor explicitly authorize the regulation. The prior version of 10 U.S.C. 8294, listed in the statute’s historical notes, did concern the appointment of doctors, which could explain the shared citation.

Subsection (h) directs the Judge Advocates General to prescribe “uniform rules of procedure” for Courts of Criminal Appeals. This is a specific regulatory task. Also, the statute provides clear instruction regarding the establishment, composition, jurisdiction, duties, and limits of authority for the Courts of Criminal Appeals, further suggesting specific direction rather than a broad grant of authority.

Subsection (h) explicitly mandates that the Judge Advocates General shall prescribe uniform rules of procedure for Courts of Criminal Appeals, indicating a direct mandate for regulation.

While 10 U.S.C. 8720 is primarily a definitional statute, 10 U.S.C. 8730(e) is also cited as statutory authority, which speaks to the export of petroleum. This implies a more specific regulatory task related to export controls using the Secretary of Energy’s definitions in 8720. This regulatory task is described in Part 730.

10 U.S.C. 8720 is explicitly cited as statutory authority for 15 CFR Part 730, indicating a directly mandated relationship.

Although 10 U.S.C. 8720 is a definition statute, its inclusion as an authority for 15 CFR Part 738 suggests that the definitions provided in the statute are to be used in the creation and implementation of the Commerce Control List and Country Chart. This indicates a clear instruction on a specific regulatory task. 10 U.S.C. 8730(e) also listed as an authority for 15 CFR Part 738 concerns exports and this clearly instructs the agency.

10 U.S. Code § 8720 is explicitly listed as an authority for 15 CFR Part 738.

10 U.S.C. 8720 is a definition section, but 10 U.S.C. 8730(e) is also cited. While definitions aren’t delegations, 8730(e) implies that the agency has a specific task of implementing export controls related to materials defined in 8720 for national defense purposes, even if it uses the term appropriate.

10 U.S.C. § 8720 is explicitly listed as an authority for 15 CFR Part 774. This indicates a direct mandate, as the regulation is implementing or related to the statute.

Subsection (g)(3) of the statute grants the Secretary of the Navy the power to “prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.” This is a broad delegation of rulemaking authority, applying to all of the Secretary’s functions, powers, and duties described in Title 10. It does not specify particular regulatory tasks.

The statute, 10 U.S. Code § 8013, lists 42 U.S.C. 8013 as an authority for the regulation 24 CFR Part 891. However, 10 U.S. Code § 8013 focuses on the powers and duties of the Secretary of the Navy, while 24 CFR Part 891 pertains to supportive housing for the elderly and persons with disabilities, a function of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The HUD regulations would not have any relationship to the powers and duties of the Secretary of the Navy. Therefore, the cross-citation is related by name and reference in authority, but neither directly mandated nor explicitly authorized, rather, it’s an error.

While the statute outlines specific responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary, the explicit authorization to “prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title” constitutes a broad delegation of rulemaking authority. It does not specify particular regulatory tasks or gaps to be filled beyond the scope of the Secretary’s general functions.

The statute authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties, which includes the release, dissemination, and sale of visual information materials, but it does not mandate it.

Subsection (g)(3) of the statute grants the Secretary of the Navy the authority to “prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.” This is a broad grant of rulemaking authority without specifying the regulatory tasks.

The regulation cites 10 U.S.C. 8013 in its authority section, indicating a direct mandate.

10 U.S.C. 8013 provides broad authority to the Secretary of the Navy to “prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.” While the functions, powers, and duties themselves are somewhat defined, the statute doesn’t specifically instruct the agency on a regulatory task. Instead, the regulation (32 CFR Part 861) uses this broad authority to define DoD transportation quality and safety review program.

32 CFR Part 861 explicitly cites 10 U.S.C. 8013 as its authority. This indicates a direct mandate.

Section 8013(g)(3) grants the Secretary of the Navy the power to “prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.” This provides broad authority to create regulations related to the Secretary’s general responsibilities.

The regulation cites 10 U.S.C. 8013 as its authority.

The statute provides clear instructions on how the Secretary of the Army should regulate access to recruit living areas, particularly with regard to gender and timing. This falls under Specific Authority because it identifies a specific regulatory task.

10 U.S.C. § 7420 pertains to the privacy of recruits during basic training and mandates specific access limitations to living areas. 15 CFR Part 754 concerns short supply controls and export limitations. While 10 U.S.C. 8720 is listed under the ‘Authority’ section of 15 CFR Part 754, 10 U.S.C. § 7420 is not the same as 10 U.S.C. 8720, and there is no explicit authorization or mandate connecting this privacy regulation to short supply controls. Therefore, they are related through Title 10 but neither directly mandated nor explicitly authorized to influence the other.

The statute explicitly instructs the Secretary of the Army to create regulations related to designing heraldic items and providing advice, and regarding reimbursement for services rendered. This level of specificity aligns with the “Specific Authority” delegation category.

10 U.S. Code § 7594 explicitly states that the Secretary of the Army will prescribe regulations related to furnishing heraldic services and reimbursement for those services. Therefore, the statute directly mandates the regulations.

The statute grants specific authority to the President and the Secretaries of the military departments to prescribe regulations governing when certain individuals (e.g., honorably discharged veterans, actors, foreign graduates) can wear military uniforms. The regulation further defines these specific circumstances, such as when and how a uniform may be worn, fulfilling a specific task laid out by the statute.

The statute, 10 U.S.C. § 772, authorizes the President and the Secretaries of military departments to prescribe regulations regarding the wearing of uniforms in certain circumstances. The regulation, 32 CFR Part 53, implements these authorizations but is not directly mandated by the statute. The statute permits, but does not require, these regulations.

While 10 U.S.C. 8012 focuses on the creation and design of the Navy seal, the regulation (32 CFR Part 845) explicitly cites it as authority. The statute grants the Secretary the power to have a seal, it is reasonable to infer that the Secretary needs authority to defend the United States abroad. The law provides a framework within which the Secretary of Navy must operate. Although not directly related, it can be related in that the Secretary of Navy has broad discretion in their role.

The statute authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to have a seal, and the design must be approved by the President. While it mandates that the Secretary shall have a seal, it doesn’t explicitly mandate specific regulations about counsel fees and other expenses in foreign tribunals. Therefore, the regulation is authorized by the statute, but not directly mandated.