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While the regulation cites numerous authorities, the explicit reference to § 1718(c)(2) and the fact that the regulation implements prompt corrective action based on the statute’s requirements regarding capital levels and distributions suggests a specific regulatory task assigned by Congress. Although terms such as “risk-based capital level” and “minimum capital level” require agency interpretation, the statute clearly identifies a regulatory gap and instructs the agency on how to address it.
The statute grants authority to the Secretary to take specific actions to assist mortgagors in default, including establishing programs for loss mitigation, payment of partial claims, and assignment/loan modification. It provides specific guidance and goals related to alternatives to foreclosure, which qualifies as a Specific Authority delegation.
While the statute outlines a specific purpose (housing for the elderly), and provides some specific conditions that the mortgage must meet to be eligible for insurance (e.g., (c)(2) specifying amounts, (c)(7) regarding the percentage of units designed for elderly persons), the core delegation in (b) empowers the Secretary to insure mortgages “upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe.” This “terms and conditions” language, coupled with the broad authority to insure any mortgage, grants the Secretary significant discretion and rulemaking authority beyond simply filling specific gaps outlined by Congress. It’s a broad mandate to implement a program, not a specific instruction to address a particular regulatory issue.
Subsection (c) states, “The Secretary is authorized to insure any mortgage (including advances on such mortgage during construction) in accordance with the provisions of this section upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe and to make commitments for insurance of such mortgage prior to the date of its execution or disbursement thereon.” This grants broad authority to the Secretary to set terms and conditions for mortgage insurance without specifying precise regulatory tasks, fitting the General Authority Delegation category.
Subsection (c) uses open ended terms but clearly instructs HUD on a specific regulatory task, determining terms and conditions on mortgage insurance eligibility. Specifically, the legislation authorizes the Secretary to “prescribe (including the minimum number of family units in the project which shall be offered for sale and provisions for the protection of the consumer and the public interest), to insure any mortgage covering a one-family unit in a multifamily project”. This specificity of direction, even with discretion, classifies it as a specific authority delegation
The statute provides broad rulemaking authority for the agency. While it mentions broad objectives, it does not instruct the agency on a specific regulatory task.
The statute provides clear instruction to the Secretary regarding specific regulatory tasks, such as determining eligibility for insurance, prescribing standards for acceptable properties, setting loan limits, and regulating mortgagors. Although there is discretion in how these tasks are carried out, the statute clearly identifies what the agency must regulate.
While the statute lists several specific factors to consider when deciding whether to insure a mortgage, and lists dollar amounts that must be considered, it also grants broad authority to the Secretary to “prescribe, to make commitments for the insurance of such mortgages prior to the date of their execution or disbursement thereon” without setting forth specific regulatory actions that are required or even preferred. This broad “authorization, upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe” places it in the category of General Authority. It includes aspects of Specific Authority Delegation (e.g., factors to consider), but the broad grant of discretion is closer to General Authority.
While the statute provides specific parameters for eligibility and conditions (mortgage amounts, types of mortgagors, interest rates, amortization periods), it also grants the Secretary broad discretion to prescribe “such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe” for the insurance of mortgages. The statute does not specifically define regulatory tasks but rather delegates broad rulemaking authority to further the goal of assisting private industry in providing low- and moderate-income housing.
While the statute outlines various circumstances under which the Secretary may insure mortgages, it grants broad discretion in determining the “terms and conditions” of insurance, eligibility (beyond the specific scenarios), and overall implementation. This open-endedness and the general authorization to insure mortgages without highly specific instructions beyond some limited exceptions classifies this as a general authority delegation, allowing HUD significant leeway in crafting the actual regulatory framework.
The statute specifically instructs the Secretary on regulatory tasks, like defining “imminent default,” establishing programs for partial claims and mortgage assignments, and setting terms for these programs. While some terms are open-ended (e.g., “terms and conditions acceptable to the Secretary”), the statute identifies specific regulatory gaps and provides direction.
While the statute directs the Secretary to make rules, it does not specify particular regulatory tasks. The delegation is broad, tasking the Secretary with creating rules “necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter” without identifying specific gaps or issues to be addressed by regulation.
While the statute does instruct the agency to regulate, it uses broad language (“as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter”) without specifying particular regulatory tasks or gaps to be addressed. This fits Hickman’s definition of a general authority delegation.
While the statute uses the phrase “as may be necessary,” it’s still a broad delegation of rulemaking authority. It doesn’t identify specific regulatory tasks but rather directs the Secretary to create regulations to “carry out the provisions of this subchapter,” encompassing a wide range of potential regulatory actions. This falls under Hickman’s definition of General Authority.
The statute provides specific guidance on the types of projects eligible for insurance, the characteristics of the mortgagors, and limitations on mortgage amounts. While the Secretary has discretion, it is within the bounds of the specifics mentioned in the statute. The parameters set for maximum amount per unit clearly instructs an agency on a specific regulatory task. The use of reasonable and necessary are also part of the instructions.
The statute provides specific direction to the Secretary regarding eligibility requirements, conditions, and limits for mortgage insurance, including setting standards for property acceptability and mortgage terms. While the language contains some open-ended terms like “such terms and conditions as he may prescribe,” it clearly instructs the agency on specific regulatory tasks related to the mortgage insurance program.
The statute provides broad rulemaking authority to the Secretary to make rules and regulations “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.” It doesn’t identify a specific regulatory task or gap. The phrase “as may be necessary” is a general directive, fitting Hickman’s definition of General Authority.
The statute provides broad rulemaking authority to the Secretary to create regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the subchapter, without specifying the regulatory tasks. The phrase “as may be necessary” provides little constraint.
The statute provides broad rulemaking authority (“such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter”) without specifically identifying particular regulatory tasks or gaps to be addressed beyond implementing the subchapter’s provisions. Although the scope is limited to the subchapter, it does not delineate specific regulations to be created.
The statute provides broad rulemaking authority to the Secretary to make rules and regulations “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter,” without specifying particular regulatory tasks or gaps.
The statute provides broad rulemaking authority (“make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter”) without specifying particular regulatory tasks. It doesn’t identify a specific regulatory gap or instruct the agency on a specific rule to promulgate, falling under the “General Authority” delegation.
The statute grants broad authority to the Secretary to make rules and regulations that are “necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter” without identifying specific regulatory tasks or gaps. This constitutes a general delegation of rulemaking authority.
The statute grants broad rulemaking authority to the Secretary to issue regulations “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.” It does not specify any particular regulatory tasks or gaps the Secretary should address. The phrase “as may be necessary” is broad and open-ended, fitting the description of a General Authority delegation despite using the word “necessary”.
While the statute directs the Secretary to make rules, it does so in broad terms, stating only that the rules should be “necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.” It doesn’t specify what regulatory tasks or gaps need to be addressed, leaving the Secretary with significant discretion. Therefore, this is considered a General Authority delegation.
The statute provides broad authority to the Secretary to create rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the entire subchapter, without identifying any specific regulatory tasks. While the statute includes “necessary,” which sounds specific, Hickman identifies this as a general term.