Database Search Results
The statute specifically identifies a prohibited activity (certifying checks without sufficient funds) and assigns the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System the task of holding hearings and potentially imposing a penalty (forfeiture of membership) for violations. This is a specific regulatory task, even though the details of how the hearing is conducted or the specific criteria for determining forfeiture are not spelled out, making it a specific authority delegation.
While the statute provides a specific issue for the Board to address (capital adequacy for membership), it gives the agency broad discretion in determining what “adequate” means in relation to various factors. This broad discretion, coupled with the authorization to make judgments based on these factors, constitutes a general delegation of authority.
The statute specifically directs the Board of Governors to assess the adequacy of capital stock and surplus in relation to the bank’s assets, liabilities, and responsibilities as a condition for membership. This is a specific regulatory task, even though it uses the open-ended term “adequate,” which falls under the “Specific Authority” category as defined by Hickman.
While the statute itself is no longer in effect, considering its nature, it falls under “General Authority” according to Hickman’s framework. The numerous U.S.C. provisions listed under the “Authority” section of the regulation, several of which are in the range of 321-338a that is mentioned in the statute, provides broad rulemaking authority for the Federal Reserve System related to membership of state banks, but they do not provide specific regulatory tasks in relation to any particular repealed statute.
The regulation cites numerous statutes, including 12 U.S.C. 248, 321-338, 1813(q), 1818, 1844(b), 3106a, and 3108, and 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E). Given the breadth of statutes cited and the nature of the regulation covering many aspects of retail foreign exchange transactions, this is a General Authority delegation. While some individual statutes might provide specific direction, the overall structure of the regulation shows a delegation that is broad and not focused on a single, specific regulatory task.
The statute grants the Board of Governors broad authority to regulate the activities of state member banks, as indicated by the clause that “the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may limit the activities of State member banks and subsidiaries of State member banks in a manner consistent with section 1831a of this title.” This provides the agency with significant discretion without specifying particular regulatory tasks, therefore fitting the “General Authority” delegation category. The reference to “regulations of the board made pursuant thereto” also suggests broad rulemaking authority.
The statute provides the Board of Governors the discretion to “waive such six months’ notice in individual cases and may permit any such State bank or trust company to withdraw from membership in a Federal reserve bank prior to the expiration of six months from the date of the written notice of its intention to withdraw”. This gives a specific area of regulation, even though it uses the term “discretion”.
While the statute provides discretion to the Board of Governors, it specifically instructs them on the regulatory task of setting conditions to waive the six-month notice period for withdrawals. The statute addresses a specific regulatory gap concerning the timing of withdrawals, which allows the agency to decide when and how to allow earlier withdrawals.
While the statute doesn’t explicitly delineate every single regulation the Board must enact, it provides specific instructions and criteria around the process of bank withdrawals from the Federal Reserve System. The statute grants the Board discretion to waive the six-month notice and set conditions, which falls under managing a specific regulatory task.
While the statute provides discretion to the Board of Governors, it clearly instructs the agency on a specific regulatory task: determining the adequacy of capital stock and surplus for banks seeking membership. The language “in the judgment of the Board of Governors… are adequate in relation to the character and condition of its assets and to its existing and prospective deposit liabilities and other corporate responsibilities” provides specific context for the agency’s judgement.
The statute clearly instructs the Board of Governors on a specific regulatory task: assessing the adequacy of capital stock and surplus for banks seeking membership in the Federal Reserve System. While the statute uses the open-ended term “adequate,” it still directs the agency to make a judgment based on specified criteria (character and condition of assets, deposit liabilities, and other corporate responsibilities).
While seemingly broad, the statute specifically directs the Board to make regulations concerning compliance with the provisions of the subchapter, and further authorizes action, including potentially revoking membership, upon a determination of non-compliance. This constitutes a specific regulatory task: ensuring compliance with the subchapter, and establishes consequences for failing to comply with either the subchapter or the board’s regulations.
The statute directs the Board to take specific action (requiring surrender of stock and forfeiture of membership) if a member bank fails to comply with the provisions of the subchapter or the Board’s regulations. This falls under the “clearly instructs an agency on a specific regulatory task” definition, even though the standards for compliance are potentially broad. The authority to restore membership also counts as a specific regulatory power related to compliance.
The statute directs the Board to take action (require surrender of stock) if a member bank fails to comply with the regulations made pursuant to the subchapter. While the subchapter itself might be broad, this specific section clearly instructs the agency on a regulatory task (ensuring compliance through enforcement).
The statute specifically directs the Board of Governors to regulate the process of withdrawal from membership in a Federal Reserve bank, including the ability to waive the six-month notice requirement and set conditions for such waivers. While “in its discretion and subject to such conditions as it may prescribe” gives the board leeway, it is still directing a specific regulatory task, which is to manage the conditions for withdrawal.
The statute gives the Board of Governors the power to “waive such six months”™ notice in individual cases and may permit any such State bank or trust company to withdraw from membership in a Federal reserve bank prior to the expiration of six months from the date of the written notice of its intention to withdraw subject to such conditions as it may prescribe”. Although the statute grants discretion, it still identifies a specific regulatory task relating to withdrawal conditions.
The statute provides specific instructions regarding bank examinations. It instructs the Board on how to handle state examinations, when to conduct their own examinations, and how to handle the expenses. Even the discretionary language (“when it deems necessary”) still directs the agency towards a specific regulatory task related to bank examinations.
The statute provides the Board with the authority to (1) accept state examinations and reports, (2) order special examinations, (3) assess examination expenses, and (4) share confidential supervisory information. These constitute a clear instruction on specific regulatory tasks.
The statute specifically directs the Board on matters related to bank examinations, including accepting state examinations, conducting special examinations, approving report forms, and assessing expenses. Even though the Board retains discretion, the regulatory task is clearly defined. The statute also directs the Board to disclose confidential information to specific entities.
The statute instructs the Board on a specific regulatory task: ensuring compliance with the provisions of the subchapter. While terms like “comply” and “appear” leave room for interpretation, the statute clearly delineates the area the agency can regulate and act upon (member bank compliance), giving the Board clear direction and constraint.
The statute clearly instructs the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to implement regulations related to specific tasks: ensuring compliance with the subchapter, requiring the surrender of stock for non-compliant banks, and restoring membership. This surpasses a general grant by specifying the regulatory action and its justification.
While 12 U.S.C. § 325 specifically instructs the Board to conduct bank examinations, the regulation (12 CFR Part 240) also relies on 12 U.S.C. 248, 321-338, 1813(q), 1818, 1844(b), 3106a, and 3108; which provide broad rulemaking authority without specific regulatory tasks identified for retail foreign exchange. Therefore, given the reliance on a broad swath of authorities, including § 325, the delegation is better categorized as a General Authority.
The statute specifically instructs the Board to conduct examinations of member banks. While the statute uses terms like “approved,” it is still directly tasking the agency with examinations rather than broadly allowing it to set standards.
The statute clearly instructs the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on a specific regulatory task: conducting examinations of member banks. It outlines who is authorized (the Board), what they are authorized to do (conduct examinations), and to whom this authority applies (member banks). This qualifies as a specific authority delegation, despite using open-ended terms like “approved.”
The statute specifically instructs the Board of Governors on a regulatory task: the acceptance or rejection of state examinations of banks. It also allows the Board to order special examinations and approve the form of the report. The power to assess expenses for the examination is another delegated task. The discretion granted is cabined by the overall purpose of bank supervision.