Database Search Results
The statute directly mandates the transfer of rulemaking authority, specifically regarding functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Comptroller of the Currency regarding savings associations. This identifies a clear regulatory task, fitting the definition of a specific authority delegation.
The statute explicitly transfers rulemaking authority regarding specific functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to other agencies, such as the Board of Governors and the Comptroller of the Currency. This includes authority concerning savings associations. This constitutes a specific regulatory task, aligning with Hickman’s “Specific Authority” delegation.
While 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(B) transfers rulemaking authority, it does so in the context of transferring specific functions previously held by the Office of Thrift Supervision relating to savings associations to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The statute identifies a specific regulatory area (functions and rulemaking related to savings associations) and instructs the OCC to assume that responsibility. This is a clear delegation of authority to regulate a specific sector.
12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(B)(ii) specifically transfers rulemaking authority related to savings associations from the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. This is a clear instruction on a specific regulatory task, fitting Hickman’s definition of Specific Authority Delegation.
While the statute provides extensive power to the corporation, it does so within the specific context of acting as a receiver for covered financial companies. Each enumerated power is tailored to the task of orderly liquidation and winding up of such companies. It uses terms like “appropriate”, and identifies explicit regulatory tasks, aligning with the “Specific Authority” category of Kristin Hickman’s delegation framework.
While 12 U.S. Code § 5390 lays out the powers and duties of the Corporation, subsection (c)(8)(H) “Recordkeeping” clearly instructs primary financial regulatory agencies to jointly prescribe regulations requiring that financial companies maintain records with respect to qualified financial contracts. The statute also directs the agencies to consider size, risk, complexity, leverage, and interconnectedness, when prescribing these regulations. This represents a specific regulatory task identified by Congress.
The statute provides specific instructions to the agencies, directing them to establish minimum capital requirements for various financial institutions. It also provides floors on those requirements, pointing to specific regulatory tasks related to insured depository institutions. Additionally, the statute details the content of those rules.
12 U.S.C. § 5381(b) specifically instructs the Corporation, in consultation with the Secretary, to define via regulation the consolidated revenue threshold for determining whether a company is predominantly engaged in financial activities. This falls under Kristin Hickman’s “Specific Authority Delegations” because it directs the agency on a very specific regulatory task using relatively objective criteria.
While Title II of Dodd-Frank grants broad authority for orderly liquidations, Section 5385 specifically instructs the Commission and the Corporation to issue rules to implement this section. This focuses the agency’s rulemaking on the specifics of SIPC’s role in the liquidation process.
The statute specifically instructs the Commission and the Corporation to issue rules to implement this section, indicating a specific regulatory task.
The statute provides specific instruction on the subject matter to be addressed in the regulations, including “rights, interests, and priorities of creditors, counterparties, security entitlement holders” and addressing “potential for conflicts of interest.” Even using open-ended terms like “necessary or appropriate” indicates specific authority.
The statute directs the Board of Governors to issue regulations to “implement” parts A and C and the amendments made thereunder. This is a specific regulatory task identified by the statute. While “implement” allows for agency discretion in how the regulations are structured, it provides a defined task and scope.
While the statute uses broad terms like “implement”, it clearly instructs the agency (Board of Governors) on the specific regulatory task: to implement parts A and C of the relevant legislation (Pub. L. 111-203). The statute also specifies a timeframe for issuing final regulations.
The statute identifies specific regulatory tasks by instructing the Board of Governors to issue regulations to “implement parts A and C.” Although “implement” is a somewhat open-ended term, the delegation is focused on specific sections of law, making it more specific than a general grant of rulemaking authority.
While the statute does provide broad authority to establish capital requirements, it also defines the minimum level of those requirements, tying them to “generally applicable” standards in effect as of a specific date. Furthermore, subsection (b)(7) instructs agencies to develop capital requirements that address specific types of risks, referencing derivatives, securitized products, and concentrations in market share, all of which falls within the definition of “clearly instructs an agency on a specific regulatory task or gap.”
The statute provides specific instructions on how to establish minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements. It even sets a floor for the capital requirements, explicitly stating that the requirements “shall not be less than the generally applicable leverage capital requirements” in effect as of a particular date. This level of detail indicates a specific delegation. Furthermore, the inclusion of activities that “pose risks to the financial system” is a specific regulatory task.
While 12 U.S.C. § 5365 does provide specific areas for which the Board of Governors shall establish prudential standards (risk-based capital, liquidity, risk management, resolution plans, concentration limits) and may establish additional standards (contingent capital, disclosures, short-term debt limits), it does so in broad terms, granting considerable discretion to the Board. The statute does not give particular requirements of what those standards should look like in different situations. This is a broad directive that authorizes the Board to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework to enhance financial stability, without explicit directions. Therefore, it is classified as a General Authority delegation.
The statute not only instructs the Board of Governors to prescribe regulations but also outlines the purpose of those regulations (minimizing insolvency and harm to financial stability) and specific requirements that the regulations shall include, such as defining financial condition measures (regulatory capital, liquidity, etc.) and establishing escalating requirements based on financial decline (limits on capital distributions, capital restoration plans, etc.). This level of detail goes beyond a general grant of authority and provides clear instructions for the regulatory task.
The statute not only instructs the Board of Governors to prescribe regulations, but also provides specific instructions on what those regulations should cover, including defining measures of financial condition and establishing requirements that increase in stringency as the financial condition declines. This goes beyond simply authorizing rulemaking; it instructs the agency on a specific regulatory task with defined parameters.
The statute provides specific instruction to the Board of Governors, directing them to create regulations determining the criteria for requiring nonbank financial companies to establish intermediate holding companies. While the criteria itself are not defined, the statute dictates what the agency must regulate.
While the statute doesn’t specify exactly what the regulations must contain, it provides clear instructions to the Board of Governors to issue regulations to implement specific parts (A and C) of another piece of legislation. This is more targeted than a completely general grant of rulemaking authority.
The statute specifically directs the Board of Governors to establish prudential standards, including risk-based capital requirements, liquidity requirements, overall risk management requirements, resolution plan requirements, and concentration limits, demonstrating a clear instruction on a specific regulatory task. While the Board has some discretion in implementation, the specific areas to be regulated are clearly defined.
While the statute grants broad authority to the Board of Governors to establish prudential standards, it also clearly instructs the agency on specific regulatory tasks. For example, it specifies that the Board shall establish prudential standards that shall include risk-based capital requirements, liquidity requirements, overall risk management, resolution plan requirements and concentration limits. It also utilizes open-ended terms such as “appropriate”, but provides specific guidance as to how the authority must be used.
12 U.S.C. 5365(i)(2) specifically directs the relevant agencies to issue regulations defining “stress test,” establishing methodologies, prescribing report formats and content, and requiring publication of stress test results. This falls under Kristin Hickman’s “Specific Authority Delegations” because it instructs the agency on a specific regulatory task, even though there is flexibility in implementation.
This statute specifically instructs the Board of Governors to require nonbank financial companies and certain bank holding companies to submit resolution plans. The statute details the required content of these plans (ownership structure, assets, liabilities, etc.) and the process for review and revision. This level of specificity, even while using terms like “any other information that the Board of Governors…jointly require,” fits within the “Specific Authority” delegation category.