Database Search Results

While the regulation’s authority section cites many specific statutes, they are cited as a group spanning a broad range of U.S. Code sections. The regulation pertains to civil procedures broadly applicable across these cited statutes. This aligns more with granting general rulemaking authority to create procedures for enforcing various statutory provisions. Without a direct mandate for regulation, the delegation is general.

The statute 16 U.S.C. § 470w-6 related to the effective date of regulations and was repealed. 50 CFR Part 11 pertains to civil procedures, and the authority section cites several statutes including 16 U.S.C. 470aa-470mm and others, but not specifically 16 U.S.C. § 470w-6. Although related to regulations generally, the repealed statute doesn’t directly mandate or explicitly authorize the regulations in 50 CFR Part 11.

The statute grants the Secretary the authority to accept privately donated funds. While it specifies the subject matter (donated funds), it lacks specific instruction on the how regarding enforcement or handling of these donations. Therefore, the regulation defining Civil Procedures relating to these funds, can be regarded as general authority.

The statute, 16 U.S. Code § 470h-1, related to acceptance of privately donated funds. While the statute itself doesn’t explicitly mandate the creation of civil procedures, the broad authority granted to the Secretary to manage and utilize these funds arguably authorizes regulations regarding how donations are accepted, managed, and potentially enforced. 50 CFR Part 11 establishes civil procedures for a variety of statutes, including some related to cultural and natural resources that could relate to donations. While not directly mandated, these regulations are within the scope of the Secretary’s authorized powers.

While 16 U.S.C. § 470h-3 related to the lease or exchange of historic property, 50 CFR Part 11 establishes civil procedures for various statutes. This regulation does not focus on the specific regulatory task or gap outlined in 470h-3 but provides the broader procedural framework for civil enforcement. Therefore, this represents a General Authority delegation.

The statute 16 U.S.C. § 470h-3, related to the lease or exchange of historic property, is listed in the “Authorities” section alongside the regulation 50 CFR Part 11. This indicates that the statute authorized the regulation, but the regulation itself concerns civil procedures and monetary penalties related to a wide range of statutes and thus was not specifically mandated by 470h-3.

While the statute instructs that resources “shall be deposited,” the section regarding agreements with non-Federal repositories uses the term “may,” providing discretion. The language is broad enough to allow for a range of regulatory actions but does not specify precise regulatory tasks beyond the general idea of curation agreements.

The statute authorizes the Secretary to enter into agreements with non-Federal repositories regarding curation. It doesn’t mandate specific regulations, but allows for them. 50 CFR Part 11 establishes general civil procedures for the Department of Interior and references the statute in the authority section.

50 CFR Part 11 cites several statutes, including a broad range of sections within Title 16. This suggests a general rulemaking authority to establish civil procedures for enforcing these disparate statutory provisions, rather than a specific delegation to address a particular regulatory task or gap related to 16 U.S.C. 470w-5 specifically.

16 U.S.C. § 470w-5 relates to the National Museum for the Building Arts, while 50 CFR Part 11 deals with civil procedures for various statutes related to fish and wildlife, including some sections of Title 16. While 16 U.S.C. 470aa – 470mm is listed as authority for 50 CFR Part 11, 470w-5 is not among them. The statutes are related as they are both found in Title 16 but neither directly mandates nor explicitly authorizes the other.

The regulation, 50 CFR Part 11, cites a range of statutes as its authority, including 16 U.S.C. 470aa-470mm. This collection of statutes represents a broad delegation of rulemaking authority relating to civil procedures, as it doesn’t specify particular regulatory tasks associated with individual statutes. Thus, it is a general grant of authority.

The statute, 16 U.S.C. § 470x-2, related to the establishment of the National Center for Preservation Technology and Training, and has been repealed. The regulation, 50 CFR Part 11, concerns civil procedures for various statutes enforced by the Fish and Wildlife Service, and mentions some of the sections of 16 U.S. Code in its authority section. The statute 16 U.S.C. § 470x-2 is not among them but 16 U.S.C. 470aa is. Thus, they are related through the broader Title 16 concerning conservation, but the repealed statute does not directly mandate or explicitly authorize the procedures outlined in the regulation.

While 50 CFR Part 11’s authority section cites numerous statutes including 16 U.S.C. 470aa-470mm and others, these provisions, taken together, provide broad rulemaking authority to establish civil procedures for a wide range of offenses. The statutes cited cover various topics such as archeological resources, endangered species, and fisheries. The regulation isn’t focused on one specific statutory task, but rather establishes general procedures applicable to a variety of enforcement actions under different statutes.

16 U.S. Code § 470x-4, related to preservation grants, was repealed. 50 CFR Part 11 outlines civil procedures. While both deal with legal procedures and potentially involve the National Park Service (given the citation to Title 54 for the repealed statute and the agency overseeing the regulation), there’s no direct mandate or explicit authorization linking the statute to the creation of these specific civil procedures. The statute authorized grants while the regulation deals with enforcement procedures.

While 16 U.S.C. § 470b-1 relates to grants and the preservation of historical sites, the regulations in 50 CFR Part 11 are procedures applicable to many statutes and agencies (as indicated by the wide range of US Code citations in the Authority section). The original repealed Statute is not even explicitly listed in the authority section of 50 CFR Part 11. Thus, the regulation derives its authority from multiple sources, indicating the statute at hand provides broad authority across several agencies to develop enforcement procedures, rather than a task-specific regulatory mandate.

16 U.S.C. § 470b-1 authorized grants to the National Trust for Historic Preservation. 50 CFR Part 11 outlines the civil procedures for various agencies, including those dealing with historic preservation. While the CFR doesn’t directly implement the grant program itself, it provides the procedures for dealing with violations under laws related to historic preservation. Therefore, the statute and regulation are related, but the statute doesn’t explicitly mandate or authorize the specific procedures outlined in the regulation.

The statute authorizes appropriations “as may be necessary to carry out this chapter.” While it uses the language “necessary,” the statute does not instruct the agency on a specific regulatory task but rather provides the agency with the funds to achieve the chapter’s goals. This is a very broad delegation, as the specific tasks that the agency will undertake depend on their interpretation of the chapter.

The statute authorizes appropriations, which is directly linked to the ability of agencies to “carry out this chapter.” 50 CFR Part 11 cites 16 U.S.C. 470aaa-11 as authority, therefore the regulation is authorized by the statute but is not directly mandated.

The statutes listed in the “Authority” section of the regulation provide broad authority to agencies (likely the Department of Interior and/or the Fish and Wildlife Service) to create regulations for enforcing various conservation laws and historic preservation acts. While these acts themselves address specific topics, the authority to create “civil procedures” (assessment, hearing, appeals, penalties) is a broad delegation relating to enforcement, not a specific instruction on how to regulate a particular gap in the law.

The statute, 16 U.S.C. § 470x-3, related to the Preservation Technology and Training Board and has been repealed. However, the related sections from Title 16 (e.g., 470aa-470mm) under the National Historic Preservation Act and other listed statutes (e.g., Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act) authorize the agency (likely the Department of Interior through the Fish and Wildlife Service, given the CFR title and associated statutes) to create regulations regarding civil procedures for violations under those Acts. The statute itself doesn’t mandate any specific regulation, but it authorizes regulatory actions to enforce those statutes.

The statutes listed as authority for 50 CFR Part 11 (e.g., 16 U.S.C. 470aa-470mm) provide broad authority relating to the preservation of historical and archeological data. They give the agency (likely the National Park Service or related Department) discretion in how to implement the goals of historical preservation, including setting up civil procedures. These authorities do not narrowly instruct the agency to implement specific procedures or address a specific gap. Instead, they delegate a broad scope of authority to create regulations that advance the overall aims of historic preservation. The agency has discretion to create civil procedures for a broad array of activities relating to resources under their management.

The statute 16 U.S.C. § 470w-8, which related to historic light station sales, was repealed and replaced with section 305106 of Title 54. 50 CFR Part 11 is authorized by 16 U.S.C. 470aa-470mm and 470aaa-470aaa-11, which are related to historic preservation. While the specific section 470w-8 is no longer active, the broader statutory scheme provides authorization for regulations concerning civil procedures related to historic preservation, including potential sales, even though the sales provision has been moved to a different part of the US Code. The regulation is not directly mandated but is within the scope of authorized regulations.

The statute instructs the Commission (FCC) on the specific task of providing evidence of robocall violations to the Attorney General and reporting to Congress on these instances. It provides a clear task and directs the agency on what to do and how often.

While the statute, 47 U.S.C. § 227b-2, doesn’t directly mandate specific regulations related to numbering (covered in 47 CFR Part 52), it addresses robocall violations and directs the FCC to report to Congress. Since the FCC has broad authority over telecommunications, the statute could authorize, but doesn’t mandate, regulations that might affect or interact with numbering resources. For example, rules regarding blocking or tracing illegal calls could impact number administration, although this is not a direct mandate.

The statute clearly instructs the FCC on a specific regulatory task: to determine how Commission policies regarding access to number resources could be modified to help reduce access to numbers by potential perpetrators of violations of section 227(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. It even specifies possible modifications like establishing registration and compliance obligations, and requirements that providers of voice service take steps to know their customers’ identities.

47 U.S.C. § 227b-1(a)(2) states “If the Commission determines under paragraph (1) that modifying the policies described in that paragraph could help achieve the goal described in that paragraph, the Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement those policy modifications.” This authorizes the FCC to prescribe regulations, but does not mandate it.

The statute specifically instructs the Secretary to identify “reasonable and necessary activities that do not constitute information blocking.” This falls under the definition of Specific Authority, as it assigns a specific regulatory task, even using the term “reasonable and necessary.”

42 U.S.C. § 300jj-52(a)(3) states that “The Secretary, through rulemaking, shall identify reasonable and necessary activities that do not constitute information blocking for purposes of paragraph (1).” This directly mandates rulemaking.

The statute dictates specific regulatory tasks. It explicitly identifies the information that must be provided (as described in subsection (b)), the entities that must provide it (health benefits plans and PBMs under contract with specific types of plans), and the recipient of the information (the Secretary). Although the Secretary has some discretion regarding the “times, form, and manner” of information submission, the core regulatory obligation and the scope are clearly defined by the statute. Therefore, this is a specific authority delegation.

The statute 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-23 explicitly instructs the Secretary to collect specific information from health benefits plans and PBMs and specifies the “times, and in such form and manner, as the Secretary shall specify.” The regulation, 45 CFR Part 184, establishes standards and processes for fulfilling the requirements outlined in the statute. The authority citation of the regulation explicitly references 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-23. This clearly indicates a directly mandated relationship.

The statute explicitly instructs the Secretary to revise existing regulations to incorporate specific guidance regarding the treatment of genetic information as health information and prohibiting its use for underwriting purposes. This goes beyond broad rulemaking authority, pinpointing a specific task.

The statute, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9(a), states that “The Secretary shall revise the HIPAA privacy regulation… so it is consistent with the following…”. The use of “shall” indicates a direct mandate to the Secretary to revise the existing HIPAA privacy regulations in a specific manner as prescribed in the statute.

The statute provides detailed instructions and identifies specific tasks for the Secretary to perform, such as adopting standards for particular types of transactions (e.g., health claims, enrollment, payments), unique identifiers, and security standards, and reviewing and amending the standards and operating rules. Although some discretion is afforded through the use of terms like “appropriate” and “feasible,” the statute clearly delineates the regulatory tasks and the goals the Secretary must achieve.

The statute explicitly directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to adopt standards for electronic exchange of health information, unique health identifiers, and code sets, making the relationship directly mandated.

The statute clearly instructs the Secretary on a specific regulatory task: revising the HIPAA privacy regulation to address genetic information. It even provides specific instructions on how genetic information should be treated and how it should not be used (i.e., for underwriting purposes).

The statute explicitly directs the Secretary to revise the HIPAA privacy regulation to include specific provisions regarding genetic information, making the relationship directly mandated.

The statute specifically instructs the Secretary to adopt standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria for health information technology. While some discretion exists within these categories (e.g., what specific standards to adopt), the statute outlines the “what” and the “how” regarding regulatory action, which aligns with the “clearly instructs an agency on a specific regulatory task or gap” criteria for Specific Authority Delegation. The language “as necessary” adds some flexibility, but still within the specific context of setting standards.

42 U.S.C. § 300jj-14 directly mandates the Secretary to adopt standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria through rulemaking, specifying the process and timeline. The CFR explicitly lists this statute as an authority.

The statute provides a very specific directive: prohibition on excessive waiting periods, with a clear 90-day limit. This is a specific regulatory task identified by the statute.

The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-7, directly mandates that group health plans and health insurance issuers cannot apply waiting periods exceeding 90 days. The regulation, 45 CFR Part 150, provides the enforcement mechanisms for 42 U.S.C. 300gg-300gg-63 including 300gg-7, thus directly mandated.

The statute clearly instructs the Secretary to define “dependents” to which coverage shall be made available. This is a specific regulatory task, fitting within the Specific Authority delegation category. The statute identifies a regulatory gap (defining “dependents” for the purpose of the extension of coverage) and delegates the authority to fill that gap to the Secretary.

Subsection (b) of the statute explicitly mandates the Secretary to promulgate regulations to define “dependents” for the purposes of subsection (a). Therefore, the regulation is directly mandated by the statute.

While the statute mandates coverage of certain preventive services, it also specifically instructs the Secretary to establish a minimum interval between recommendation and effective date (subsection b) and permits the Secretary to develop guidelines for value-based insurance design (subsection c). These are specific regulatory tasks.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 mandates certain preventive health services coverage. However, subsection (b) directs the Secretary to establish a minimum interval, and subsection (c) permits the Secretary to develop guidelines for value-based insurance design. These subsections authorize, but do not mandate, regulatory action.

The statute provides detailed instructions on how the Secretary is to allocate and distribute grant funds for high-risk pools, specifies the criteria for states to qualify, and defines key terms. This specific guidance falls under Specific Authority as it instructs the agency on a specific task.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-45 authorizes the Secretary to provide grants to states for high risk pools. While the statute specifies certain conditions and procedures, it does not mandate the Secretary to create additional regulations beyond those needed to administer the grants, but does mandate them to provide grants to states that meet the specified conditions. Thus, it is authorized but not mandated.

The statute provides specific guidance by referencing existing sections of the tax code (26 U.S.C. § 105(h)(2), (3), (4), (5), and (8)), and directing that the rules be similar. This is instructing the agency on a specific task of ensuring non-discrimination in group health plans by importing and adapting rules from another area of law (tax). Even though “similar” provides some discretion, it’s a relatively well-defined task based on existing legal standards.

While the statute mandates that group health plans satisfy the requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 105(h)(2), it doesn’t directly mandate specific regulations to be created. However, the reference to 42 U.S.C. 300gg through 300gg-63, 300gg-91, and 300gg-92 as amended in the CFR authority, suggests the agency is authorized to create regulations to enforce provisions within this range. Since 300gg-16 falls within this range, the regulation is authorized, but the statute itself doesn’t demand its creation.

While 300gg-61 doesn’t detail how the Secretary enforces, it very specifically instructs the agency to enforce the provisions of the statute related to health insurance issuers in the individual market when states fail to do so, mirroring the enforcement authority the Secretary has in other, enumerated situations. The statute references specific criteria for triggering federal enforcement, thereby directing the agency to a very focused task.

The statute explicitly outlines the Secretary’s enforcement authority in situations where a state fails to substantially enforce requirements. This directly mandates regulatory action.